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Abstract 
 
 
The paper examines a class of phenomena that combine adverse network effects with 
moral hazard, using the motor vehicle market as an example to develop and illustrate the 
key concepts.  It is hypothesized that consumers behave as if there is a network 
externality with respect to vehicle size: the more large vehicles there are on the roads, the 
greater a consumer’s propensity to seek protection from them by driving a large vehicle 
herself.  One consequence of this is that motor vehicle manufacturers are discouraged 
from making large vehicles less hazardous to other motorists.  The paper measures the 
network effect and consequent moral hazard using disaggregate data on choice of vehicle 
type and related household characteristics, combined with a state-level measure of the 
incidence of traffic fatalities.  The results show that for each 1 million light trucks that 
replace cars, between 961 and 1,812 would-be car buyers decide to buy a light truck 
instead, in reaction to the increased risk of death posed by the incremental light trucks.  
This network effect, when run in reverse, creates egregious incentives for vehicle 
manufacturers: for every life saved due to safety innovations that make light trucks less 
deadly to other motorists, manufacturers can expect to sell about 31 fewer light trucks. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 When a good exhibits a network externality, the value of a unit of the good 
increases with the number of units consumed in aggregate (Economides, 1996).  
Generally, this only has to be true in a relative sense; that is, my consumption of the 
network good may make other consumers of the good better off, or non-consumers of the 
good worse off, or both.  The overall welfare effect of more people joining a network, 
then, is ambiguous; it depends on the balance of positive membership externalities and 
negative non-membership externalities that, taken together, make up a network 
externality. 
 Given the possibility of network effects with adverse consequences for welfare, a 
particular concern arises when some agent has the incentive and ability to manipulate the 
size (or perceived size) of a network externality to increase her own gain at the expense 
of the public good.  This paper characterizes and provides guidance for identifying and 
measuring a class of phenomena that combine adverse network effects with moral hazard.  
A theoretical model is used to illustrate the welfare implications that arise from the set of 
conditions that characterize these phenomena.  Through empirical analysis of a case 
example, the market for motor vehicles, the paper demonstrates that the characterizing 
conditions give rise to a quantifiable network effect and moral hazard problem.  The 
results have important public policy implications, both in the motor vehicle case and 
beyond it. 
 Previous work has shown that large vehicles, such as pickup trucks and sport-
utility vehicles (SUVs), protect their occupants in collisions better than smaller vehicles.  
However, this protection comes at the cost of increased risk of injury and death to the 
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passengers of other vehicles on the road (White, 2004).  We hypothesize that, as a 
consequence of these conditions, consumers behave as if there is a network externality 
with respect to vehicle size.  That is, the more SUVs or other light trucks there are on the 
roads, the greater a consumer’s propensity to seek protection from them by driving an 
SUV or other light truck herself.1  An important consequence of this response behavior is 
adverse incentives that discourage motor vehicle manufacturers from implementing 
changes to make large vehicles less hazardous to other motorists.  If they do so, they 
reduce the perceived size of the network externality and so can expect to sell fewer large 
vehicles, which are more profitable than small vehicles. 
 The empirical results show that these effects are more than just an object of 
speculation.  Combining disaggregate data on vehicle choice and related household 
characteristics with a state-level measure of the incidence of traffic fatalities, we estimate 
the effect of risk of death in an accident on the decision to purchase a light truck versus a 
car.  The results are then combined with White’s (2004) estimates of the effect of light 
truck ownership on the incidence of traffic fatalities, allowing measurement of the 
network effect.  We find that for each 1 million light trucks that replace cars, between 
961 and 1,812 would-be car buyers decide to buy a light truck instead, in reaction to the 
increased risk of death posed by the incremental light trucks on the road.  This network 
effect, when run in reverse, creates egregious incentives for motor vehicle manufacturers: 
for every life saved due to safety innovations that make light trucks less deadly to other 
motorists, manufacturers can expect to sell about 31 fewer light trucks. 
                                                 
1 Note that there need not be an actual network externality (i.e., value of a unit increases with quantity 
consumed in aggregate) for consumers to behave as if there is a network externality. 
 4
 Other applications of the theory include so-called “white flight” and the role of 
real estate agents (Georgetown Law Journal, 1970; Harvard Law Review, 1980), 
community spending standards and the role of marketing (see, e.g., Frank, 2005), and 
labor market “rat race” outcomes (see, e.g., Landers et al., 1996).  As a class, these 
situations represent complex social and economic problems.  The presence of network 
externalities implies a role for collective action to improve welfare in each case.  
However, the fact that these situations are characterized by moral hazard suggests that 
these and similar policy problems must be viewed as involving the potential for 
adversarial confrontations between private and public interests.  Such problems must be 
handled carefully and with recognition of the special costs and risks they may involve. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the conditions 
that characterize adverse network effects with moral hazard and presents a simple model 
of their effects on welfare.  Section 3 looks at several examples and applications of the 
theory.  Section 4 describes the empirical results from the motor vehicle case.  Section 5 
discusses policy implications.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theory 
2.1  Characterization 
 Adverse network effects with moral hazard represent a special case of network 
externalities and so require a more elaborate characterization.  Four conditions 
characterize the relevant phenomena.  First, there exists an activity (e.g., consuming a 
good) that exhibits a negative externality: when one person engages in the activity, other 
people are made worse off.  Second, by engaging in the activity herself, a person partially 
 5
shields herself against the negative effects of others’ engagement.  Third, the marginal 
utility of the shielding increases with the aggregate amount of engagement in the activity; 
that is, the more others perform the action in question, the greater the marginal value the 
shielding provides relative to no shielding.  Fourth, there exists a third-party – sometimes 
a firm that transacts with the “engagers” – that (1) benefits increasingly the more people 
engage in the activity, and (2) can manipulate the intensity of the negative externality and 
the shielding effect.  One possible variation involves two or more third-parties, in which 
the capabilities of manipulating the negative externality and the shielding effect belong to 
separate parties. 
 The motor vehicle example from the introduction illustrates how the four 
conditions might manifest themselves.  The first condition, the negative externality, arises 
to the extent that an incremental SUV or light truck imposes an increased risk of injury 
and death on other motorists.  The second condition, or shielding effect, arises to the 
extent that larger vehicles are perceived to protect their occupants better against injury or 
death in an accident than smaller vehicles.  The third condition arises if people believe 
that the protection large vehicles afford becomes more valuable or essential the more 
large vehicles there are on the road.  With respect to the fourth condition, the third-party 
in question would be the motor vehicle manufacturer.  The condition is satisfied to the 
extent that the manufacturer earns a greater profit from selling a large vehicle than a 
small vehicle, and the manufacturer has some degree of control over both the risk of 
injury its vehicles impose on other motorists and the degree of protection its vehicles’ 
occupants themselves receive against injury in an accident.2 
                                                 
2 We consider whether these conditions likely apply to the motor vehicle market in section 3. 
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 It is instructive to view the third-party as a principal and the engagers as agents, 
and to think of the principal as playing a “good cop – bad cop” game with the agents.  In 
this analogy, manipulating the shielding effect is playing “good cop,” and manipulating 
the negative externality is playing “bad cop.”  The shielding effect and negative 
externality might be used, respectively, as a carrot and stick to obtain desired action by 
the agent, much as police might use “good cop” and “bad cop” personas to obtain a 
confession from a crime suspect.  The analogy is limited: the interrogated suspect is 
deliberately led to believe that the good cop and bad cop are acting independently, 
whereas such deception is not a critical characteristic of the phenomena we are 
considering.  But our analogy is still instructive to the extent that “good cop” and “bad 
cop” behaviors work mutualistically; as will be demonstrated, the negative externality is 
only valuable to the principal to the extent that there is a shielding effect, and vice versa.3 
 As mentioned above, the principal and agent might be seller-and-buyer of a good 
or service (or buyer-and-seller), though not necessarily.  In the next section, we present a 
simple model to characterize the incentives and shed light on the welfare consequences 
associated with adverse network effects.  In this model, the principal does not transact 
with agents, but benefits from their actions through a positive externality.4 
 
2.2  A Model 
 Consider agents i distributed uniformly based on a parameter [ ]0 01,iv v v∈ −  
where 01 0v≥ ≥ ; the number of agents is normalized to 1.  Agents must decide whether 
                                                 
3 Situations with adverse network effects are not the same as prisonners’ dilemma games.  Prisonners’ 
dilemma games have a dominant strategy, whereas adverse network effect situations do not.  Put another 
way, the relative value of a strategy under adverse network effects depends on the strategies chosen by the 
other players, whereas in a classic prisonners’ dilemma it would not.  
4 A future version of the model will examine the more general case of a transacting principal and agent. 
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or not to take a certain action.  They are made worse off when other agents take the 
action, incurring a loss ( )L Q Qλ= , where Q is the number of agents that take the action 
and 0λ ≥ .  The marginal utility to an agent of taking the action, however, is generally 
positively affected by other agents taking the action.  If an agent i does not take the 
action, she receives ( )iU L Q= − .  If the agent does take the action, she receives 
( )i iU L Q= Ψ − , where ( )i iv L QθΨ = +  is the agent’s reservation price for the action 
and 0 1θ≤ ≤ .  An agent will take the action if 0iΨ > . 
 This formulation – specifically, if 0θλ >  – implies a network externality: 
increases in aggregate action-taking, Q, beget an increase in reservation prices.  We will 
refer to θλ  as the size of the network externality. 
 The principal is able to manipulate the values of λ  and θ  up or down, at a cost.  
Assume that  λ  and θ  take on baseline values of 0λ  and 0θ , respectively, when not 
being manipulated by the principal; and that 0 0 1θ λ < , so small exogenous changes in Q 
do not result in a corner solution in which all agents take the action or all agents do not 
take the action.  The principal’s profit function can be written: 
 ( ) ( ), ,Q Cλ θ λ θΠ = −  (1) 
where the cost function, ( ),C λ θ , is symmetric relative to 0λ λ=  and 0θ θ= .  
Specifically, ( ) 0Cλ λ ≥  and ( ) 0Cλλ λ >  for 0λ λ≥ ; ( ) 0Cθ θ ≥  and ( ) 0Cθθ θ >  for 
0θ θ≥ ;  ( ) ( )02C Cλ λλ λ λ= − − , ( ) ( )02C Cθ θθ θ θ= − − , ( ) ( )02C Cλλ λλλ λ λ= − , and 
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( ) ( )02C Cθθ θθθ θ θ= − ; and 0Cλθ =  everywhere.5  We assume further that 
( )0 0, 0C λ θ = .  The cost function is continuous everywhere, and it is twice differentiable 
everywhere except at 0λ λ=  and 0θ θ= . 
 We define welfare in terms of agents’ utilities to be:6 
 0
0 1
v
i iv
W U dv−≡ ∫  (2) 
 In equilibrium, there will exist [ ]* 0 01,v v v∈ −  such that, for all * 0,iv v v⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , 
agents take the action, while all other agents do not take the action.  Thus, *0Q v v= − .  
For interior solutions, * 0vΨ = , so: 
 
( )
( )
*
* *
0
* *
0
* *
0
* 0
0
0
0
1
v L Q
v v v
v v v
v v v
v
v
θ
θλ
θλ θλ
θλ θλ
θλ
θλ
+ =
⇒ + − =
⇒ + − =
⇒ − = −
−⇒ = −
 (3) 
 It is evident from (3) that * 0v <  when both λ  and θ  are greater than 0 (as long 
as 1θλ < ).7  This might not be interior to [ ]0 01,v v−  as, for example, when 0 1v = .  
Imposing * 0 1v v> −  in (3): 
                                                 
5 These expressions use the substitutions ( )0 0λ λ λ λ= + −  and ( )0 0 02λ λ λ λ λ− = − −  and 
analogous substitutions corresponding to θ . 
6 Because the principal in the model does not transact with the agents and returns to the principal from 
agent action are a positive externality, the relationship of the principal’s utility to agents’ utility is not 
defined – in fact, any such definition would be arbitrary.  Accordingly, we give the principal’s utility zero 
weight in the welfare function, effectively treating the principal in the way that a regulator is typically 
treated in industrial organization models. 
7 1θλ ≥  would cause Q to blow up, precipitating the corner solution * 0 1v v= − . 
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 ( )( )
* 0
0
0 0 0 0
0
1
1
1 1 1
1
v
v v
v v v v
v
θλ
θλ
θλ θλ θλ θλ
θλ
−= > −−
⇒ − > − − = − − +
⇒ < −
 (4) 
We modify (3) accordingly: 
 
0
* 0
0 0
  if 1
1
1    if 1
v
v
v
v v
θλ θλθλ
θλ
−⎧ ≤ −⎪= −⎨⎪ − > −⎩
 (5) 
 The following derivatives show how changes in parameter values affect *v : 
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0*
02 2 2
0
1
0   if 1
1 1 1
0                                                                                                               if 1
v v v v v v
vdv
d
v
θ θλ θλ θ θ θ λ θ λ θ θλθλ θλ θλλ θλ
− − − − −⎧ − + − −= = ≤ ≤ −⎪= − − −⎨
> −⎩
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
0 0 0 0 0 0*
02 2 2
0
1
0   if 1
1 1 1
0                                                                                                               if 1
v v v v v v
vdv
d
v
λ θλ θλ λ λ λ θ λ θ λ θλθλ θλ θλθ θλ
⎪
− − − − −⎧ − + − −= = ≤ ≤ −⎪= − − −⎨
> −⎪⎩
 (6) 
 
*
0
0
0
0   if 1
1
1                  if 1
vdv
dv v
θλ θλθλ
θλ
−⎧ ≤ ≤ −⎪= −⎨⎪ > −⎩
 (7) 
Note that increasing either the size of the negative externality, λ , or the degree of 
shielding afforded to agents that take the desired action, θ , has a positive impact on the 
number of agents taking the action.  Further, the two manipulations are symmetric in their 
effect: when λ θ= , the impact of either manipulation is the same. 
 Now consider the principal’s problem.  The principal chooses λ  and θ  to 
maximize (1).  We begin by ruling out the principal’s reduction of λ  or θ  as an 
optimizing strategy.  This is set forth in the following proposition and corollary. 
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PROPOSITION 1:  The principal will never choose to reduce either the negative 
externality, λ , or shielding effect, θ , relative to their baseline levels. 
 
Proof:  Suppose, for 0λ  strictly greater than zero, the principal does choose to reduce λ  
to some level 1λ  such that 1 00 λ λ< < .  Marginal profit is given by: 
 ( )
*
0
21
vQ vC C Cλ λ λ
θ
λ λ λ θλ
∂Π ∂ ∂= − = − − = −∂ ∂ ∂ −  (8) 
 
Since Cλ  is strictly negative on [ )1 0,λ λ , marginal profit is strictly positive on this 
interval.  Therefore, the principal is better off setting 0λ λ= , implying 1λ λ=  is not a 
maximizing choice.  An analogous contradiction can be derived for θ .  ■ 
 
COROLLARY 1:  The principal will never choose to reduce the size of the network 
externality, θλ . 
 
 The first proposition and corollary have important implications.  When a network 
externality involving adverse effects is in place, the principal will never seek to reduce its 
size.  After all, network externalities result in more agents doing what the principal 
wants.  In the motor vehicle case, an implication is that vehicle makers will not, where 
only their own profit is concerned, engage in R&D to make pickup trucks or SUVs safer 
to other vehicles. 
 Restricting attention now to 0λ λ>  and 0θ θ> , we consider the conditions for a 
maximum.  The first-order conditions for the principal are: 
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( )
( )
*
0
2
*
0
2
0 0
1
0 0
1
0     0 1
vQ dvC C C
d
vQ dvC C C
d
λ λ λ
θ θ θ
θ
λ λ θλ
λ
θ θ θλ
λ θ
∂ − = ⇒ − − = − =∂ −
∂ − = ⇒ − − = − =∂ −
≥ ≤ ≤
 (9) 
Thus, an interior solution must observe 1λθ < : as λ  and θ  approach this boundary, the 
marginal product Qλ
∂
∂  blows up, so a corner solution at 
*
0 1v v= −  would be reached 
before 1λθ ≥ . 
 The second-order sufficient conditions for a maximum are that the first principal 
minor of the system’s Hessian be negative and its determinant positive.  The Hessian is 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2 00
3 3
2
2 2 2
0 0
2 3 3
12
1 1
1 2
1 1
vv
C
H
v v
C
λλ
θθ
θλθ
θλ θλλ θλ
θλ λ
λ θ θ θλ θλ
+⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤∂ Π ∂ Π −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ − −⎢ ⎥∂ ∂∂⎢ ⎥≡ = ⎢ ⎥+∂ Π ∂ Π⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ − −⎣ ⎦
 (10) 
and its determinant is given by: 
 ( ) ( )
( )
( )
2
2 2
00 0
3 3 3
12 2
1 1 1
vv v
H C Cλλ θθ
θλθ λ
θλ θλ θλ
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞+⎜ ⎟= − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟− − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠
 (11) 
For a maximum, then, the second derivatives of Q with respect to λ  and θ , which are 
positive, must be small enough relative to the corresponding second derivatives of the 
cost function to guarantee that the diagonal elements of the Hessian are both negative.  
Otherwise, either the determinant will be negative or the first principal minor will be 
positive.  Further, since the second term of (11) is positive, the requirements on the 
relative sizes of these second derivatives are made even more stringent.  Intuitively, 
increases in λ  and θ  affect Q at an increasing rate because of the network effect; that is, 
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larger values of λ  and θ  mean that further increases in these parameters are transmitted 
into increases in Q more rapidly.  In order for there to be an interior maximum, the cost 
of further increases in λ  and θ  must rise faster than the returns to the increases.  
Otherwise, the principal will continue to raise one or both of these parameters until all 
agents take the desired action (i.e., implying a corner solution at * 0 1v v= − ). 
 Another requirement for an interior maximum is based on the first-order 
conditions, given the second-order conditions just discussed.  We require: 
 ( ) ( )0 0
0 0
2 2
0 0
 
 and  
1 1
v v
C Cθ λθ θ λ λ
λ θ
θ λ θλ= =≤ ≤− −  (12) 
If one of these conditions is not met – say, the condition on Cθ  – the principal will 
choose a corner solution at 0θ θ= .  An interior maximum may still be chosen with 
respect to λ ; the conditions operate independently of each other. 
 A third requirement concerns the upper bound condition 1θ ≤ .  We require: 
 ( )
0
21 1
v
Cθ θ
λ
λ= ≥ −  (13) 
Otherwise the principal will choose a corner solution at 1θ = . 
 We state the following lemma: 
 
LEMMA 1:  There exists an interior maximum for the principal’s optimization problem 
on 0λ λ≥  and 0 1θ θ≤ ≤  if (1) the second derivatives of cost with respect to λ  and θ  
are large relative to the second derivatives of Q with respect to λ  and θ , (2) 
( )0
0
2
0
 
1
v
Cθ θ θ
λ
θ λ= ≤ −  and ( )0
0
2
01
v
Cλ λ λ
θ
θλ= ≤ − , and (3) ( )
0
21 1
v
Cθ θ
λ
λ= ≥ − . 
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 Our second main result follows from the second condition in the lemma, when 
strict inequality holds. 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  The principal will increase the size of the network externality if either 
(i) the marginal cost of increasing the negative externality,λ , evaluated at 0λ ; or (ii) the 
marginal cost of increasing the shielding effect, θ , evaluated at 0θ ; is strictly less than 
the marginal effect of doing so on the number of agents, Q, who take the desired action. 
 
 Thus, the principal’s decision to increase the size of the network externality, by 
increasing the negative externality and/or the shielding effect, depends on a simple 
comparison of private cost to private benefit. 
 The following corollary establishes an important link between the negative 
externality and shielding effect, alluded to earlier in the “good cop – bad cop” discussion. 
 
COROLLARY 2:  The profitability to the principal of increasing the negative 
externality,λ , depends upon there being a positive level of the shielding effect, θ .  
Conversely, the profitability to the principal of increasing the shielding effect, θ , 
depends upon there being a positive level of the negative externality, λ .   
 
Proof.  
*
0vλ
∂ =∂  when 0θ = , and 
*
0vθ
∂ =∂  when 0λ = . ■ 
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That is, when agents are not given the opportunity to shield themselves partially against 
the negative externality by doing what the principal wants, exacerbating agent losses by 
enlarging the externality does not precipitate additional desired agent actions. 
 A welfare result for λ  is needed to establish that manipulation of this variable 
indeed constitutes moral hazard.  We state the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: Increasing the negative externality, λ , unambiguously diminishes 
welfare. 
 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
 
 In the motor vehicle context, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 together imply that 
vehicle makers may have an incentive to make SUVs and other light trucks less safe for 
other motorists, even though doing so clearly decreases motorists’ welfare.  As we recall 
from Proposition 2, the incentive to make light trucks less safe depends only the private 
benefit of doing so exceeding the private cost of manipulation.  Private and social 
benefits likely diverge because the risk of death caused by light trucks also drives sales 
for light trucks. 
 Next, we derive welfare results for θ : 
 
PROPOSITION 4:  Increasing the shielding effect, θ ,  reduces welfare if 02vλθ λ
−<  and 
increases welfare if 02
vλθ λ
−> . 
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Proof.  See Appendix. 
 
 Interestingly, increasing θ , the degree of shielding afforded to people that take 
the principal’s desired action, does not unambiguously increase agents’ welfare.  When 
λ  is relatively small (i.e., less than 0v ), welfare always increases with θ .  But when 
0vλ > , welfare increases with θ  only when θ  is sufficiently large; otherwise, the social 
costs that θ  imposes by encouraging more agents to take the action outweigh the benefits 
that it provides in reducing agent losses.  This is because, when θ  is relatively small, the 
number of inframarginal agents (i.e., already taking the action) is small relative to the 
number of marginal agents, all else being equal.  Both sets of agents benefit from 
increases to θ , but marginal agents enlarge the negative externality while inframarginal 
agents do not.  So, the benefits from increases to θ  are gained at lower social cost when 
θ  is larger than when it is smaller, given 0vλ > . 
 The implications in the motor vehicle case may seem counterintuitive.  Better 
safety protections for the occupants of SUVs and other light trucks are not socially 
beneficial when light trucks impose large risks on other motorists, unless those safety 
protections are already quite substantial.  Thus the socially optimal strategy with respect 
to interior safety in light trucks is ambiguous when the externally posed risk is large: it 
might involve maximal protection (i.e., 0
1 vθ λ
−= ) or minimal protection (i.e., 0θ = , no 
different than for cars). 
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2.3  Summary and Application to Empirics 
 The model demonstrates several theoretical outcomes of the four conditions 
described at the beginning of this section, and it provides a basis for empirically 
estimating these outcomes in applicable situations.  First, the characterizing conditions 
imply an actual or perceived network externality with respect to the action in question.  
Second, these conditions imply that the third-party/principal will wish to increase the 
negative externality and/or shielding effect when the private benefit to doing so exceeds 
the private cost.  Third, increasing the negative externality (and sometimes the shielding 
effect) is detrimental to welfare, thus the third-party exhibits moral hazard. 
 The model shows that the network externality is a function of a negative 
externality combined with a shielding effect.  Thus, the network effect may be measured 
by estimating two things: the negative externality involved in taking the action in 
question, and the agent’s shielding response function to that negative externality (that is, 
the effect of an increase in the negative outcome that results from the negative externality 
on the agent’s propensity to choose the action in question). 
 Since increasing the negative externality is typically in the third-party’s interests, 
according to the model, moral hazard may be measured in terms of the tradeoff between 
benefit to the third-party from incremental agent actions and the benefit to agents (and, 
hence, society) of mitigating the negative outcome that results from the negative 
externality.  This may be accomplished by examining the change in the agent’s shielding 
response function due to different values of the negative externality.  Since the negative 
externality and the agent’s shielding response are both estimated when measuring the 
network effect, no further estimation is needed to generate a measure of the moral hazard; 
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one only needs to fit the existing model of agent response with different hypothetical 
values of the negative externality. 
  In the motor vehicle case, one of the two critical components of the network 
externality – the negative externality of vehicle size – has already been measured 
empirically by White (2004).  In section 4 of this paper, we estimate the agent’s shielding 
response function. 
 
3.  Examples and Applications 
 The incentive and welfare problems illustrated in the model may accrue to a 
variety of market situations, as adverse network effects combined with moral hazard may 
characterize a range of economic phenomena.  In this section, we consider three 
applications of the adverse network effects model. 
 
3.1  Motor Vehicles 
  Americans have been increasingly replacing cars with SUVs and pickup trucks 
and then replacing these vehicles with even larger SUVs and pickups.  From 1980 to 
2000, the share of motor vehicles that are light trucks increased from 22% to 39% 
(White, 2004).  Concurrently, there has been an alarming increase in the number of 
deaths and serious injuries in crashes on the nation’s roads, a trend that some analysts 
have attributed to the increasing prevalence of SUVs (Bradsher, 2002; Varian, 2003).  
Highway fatalities in the United States, which fell steadily from 54,600 in 1972 to 34,900 
in 1992, rose during the decade that followed to hit 38,300 in 2002 (Varian, 2003).  
Meanwhile, vehicle makers have employed advertising strategies that create the 
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perception that SUVs are safer than cars (Bradsher, 2002, pp. 127-8); and the notion that 
SUVs confer protection on their owners while menacing others has led some to 
characterize the SUV fad as an “arms race” (Bradsher, 2002, p. xix).  In view of this, it 
makes sense – or at least it is not entirely preposterous – to ask: do motor vehicle 
manufacturers have a vested interest in making light trucks less safe to other motorists? 
  The answer depends on whether the four conditions outlined in the previous 
section are satisfied for this market.  We consider each condition in turn.  White’s (2004) 
demonstration that an incremental light truck imposes an increased risk of death on other 
motorists provides evidence that the first condition is satisfied.  In an extensive empirical 
study of the determinants of serious injury and death in accidents, based on data from the 
U. S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, White shows that for each 1 
million light trucks that replace cars, between 46 and 67 additional people external to 
those light trucks (i.e., car occupants, pedestrians, bicyclists, or motorcyclists) are killed 
per year.8 
 Satisfaction of the second and third conditions is supported by anecdotal 
evidence.  White (2004) asserts that the promise of superior protection in crashes is an 
important reason for the popularity of larger vehicles.  However, hard empirical evidence 
from actual consumer decisions would bolster the argument that consumers increasingly 
choose light trucks as the risk of injury and/or death on the road grows.  We will examine 
such evidence in Section 4 of the paper. 
 The fourth condition, which must be examined with respect to motor vehicle 
manufacturers, consists of two parts.  First, motor vehicle makers do appear to earn 
                                                 
8 These figures are calculated by taking the incremental number of crashes with light trucks involving 
fatalities outside the light truck (i.e., total external effects from White’s Table 5), which range from 40 to 
58, and multiplying by 1.15, the average number of deaths per fatal crash (White 2004, p. 349). 
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substantially greater profit from selling larger vehicles, particularly SUVs.  Bradsher 
(2002, pp. 84-7) explains that the combination of low production costs associated with 
pickup trucks with luxury car pricing has enabled SUVs to achieve unprecedented profit 
margins, as high as $15,000 per vehicle.  Second, manufacturers do have control over 
both the degree of protection afforded to the occupants of its vehicles and the risk of 
injury and death its vehicles impose on other motorists.  Few would argue with the ability 
of manufacturers to manipulate the degree of interior protection: a number of features 
such as crumple zones, lateral metal bars, and airbags may be included or not included by 
manufacturers in the design of a particular vehicle model, affecting the safety of the 
model’s occupants in a crash.  Similarly, discretionary design features influence the effect 
of vehicles on the safety of other motorists in crash situations.  Light trucks are 
characterized by several features, including the height of the vehicle front-end, frontal 
stiffness, and grille guards, that increase their deadliness to car occupants that collide 
with them (Bradsher, 2002, pp. 166-206).  The risk of death imposed on other motorists 
could be reduced by modifying some or all of these features. 
 
3.2  “White Flight” 
 The adverse network effects model also sheds light on the mechanisms that led 
whites to depart cities for the suburbs, and inner suburbs for outer suburbs, in the U.S. 
during the second half of the 20th century.  White flight may be thought of as having 
involved two sets of negative externalities.  First, families fleeing the cities imposed 
losses generally on society, in that benefits accruing to having integrated communities 
were lost, segregation was itself undesirable, and open space was turned into new suburbs 
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at an unnecessary rate.  Second, they imposed perceived negative impacts specifically on 
those remaining behind in the cities, such as undesired change in the character of 
communities and fear of decline in property values.  By fleeing to the suburbs, a white 
family could protect itself against this latter set of effects of others’ flight.  Analyses of 
white flight (see, e.g., Harvard Law Review, 1980) suggest that whites do appear to have 
resorted to flight partially out of a desire for such shielding.  The dynamics of flight 
further suggest that it tends to accelerate as the total share of whites fleeing a community 
grows; this is reflected in the notion of the “tipping point,” a point at which a partially 
integrated community begins to move inexorably toward becoming an all-black 
segregated community (Harvard Law Review, 1980, p. 942).  Thus, white flight seems to 
have exhibited a network externality: the more white families departed, the greater the 
perceived value of departing (or cost of not departing) for remaining white families. 
 In this context, real estate brokers and suburban developers appear to have 
accelerated the process of white flight by consciously manipulating the network 
externality.  Real estate brokers engaged in a notorious practice called “blockbusting,” 
whereby a realtor would generate business by “warning” white families in a 
neighborhood about the imminent entry of blacks (Harvard Law Review, 1980, p. 943).  
This practice was intended to stoke racial fears and precipitate panic sales of property, 
generating additional real estate commissions. 
 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 declared blockbusting illegal, but this prohibition is 
unlikely to have eliminated the moral hazard problem inherent in white flight, as our 
model suggests.  Though a realtor or developer might have been prohibited from actively 
stoking racial animus, various marketing and selling strategies were still available to 
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profit off the extant level of animus.  For example, real estate developers could build 
increasingly insular subdivisions with gates and other security features to provide 
effective shielding against the losses feared as a consequence of racial migration trends.  
Realtors could then market such communities to whites as “enclaves,” or as “safe” and 
“exclusive,” conveying legally and without overt racial meaning that these communities 
offered the protection whites were looking for.  Such practices might reduce welfare, our 
model suggests, if racial animus is great enough and the ability of suburban communities 
to truly insulate whites is not sufficiently great. 
 
3.3  Community Consumption Standards 
 A growing literature in economics recognizes the role of social considerations in 
consumption decisions and associated market outcomes (Scitovsky, 1976; Frank, 1999; 
Becker and Murphy, 2000; Luttmer, 2005).  Chao and Schor (1998), for example, show 
that for “socially visible” products, such as designer jeans and sports cars, price and 
quality are less highly correlated than for non-visible products.  Frank (2005) describes 
the role of social influences in the decision of whether to purchase a house in a top-
ranked school district or an average school district: the prospects of one’s child are 
affected by this decision because they depend on the child’s position relative to other 
children, whose positions in turn depend upon the decisions their parents make.  Analyses 
such as these are pointing out what sociologists have long noted but economists have, 
until recently, failed to account for: that there is a non-“utilitarian” component to 
individuals’ utility, perhaps more for certain types of goods than others, that is a function 
of other people’s demonstrated or stated preferences for those goods.  In other words, the 
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decisions of people as a group establish standards for consumption, and individual utility 
from consumption is often based on positioning relative to the standard. 
 Socially driven consumption may be motivated more by a stick than a carrot if 
one fears significant losses from failing to buy a given good.  Otnes and Pleck (2003), for 
example, describe how affluent couples may face social sanctions if they opt for a simple 
rather than a lavish wedding (p. 21).  Such pressures do not only guide decisions of the 
bride and groom; it is generally considered de rigueur for guests to spend as much on a 
wedding gift as they believe is being spent on them at the reception (Otnes and Pleck, 
2003, p. 19).  In such cases, the individual decision to adopt the higher-priced product 
(e.g., wedding, gift, school district) involves a negative externality in that it reinforces 
pressures on others to conform.  However, the decision also shields the individual 
partially from the losses incurred by non-conformists, and such shielding becomes more 
valuable in relative terms the more people adopt the higher-priced product and the greater 
the associated pressure to conform.  All of this is consistent with the adverse network 
effects model and, therefore, the view of community-influenced consumption decisions 
as involving a network externality. 
 Our model sheds new light on community consumption standards, particularly the 
implications for third-party manipulation of these standards.  Marketers, the model 
suggests, have an incentive to increase the extent to which people are driven to purchase 
their products by social pressures.  Such influence might be brought to bear through 
advertising that suggests that the consumer will be more fully accepted by others if she 
consumes the product or rejected by others if she fails to consume the product.9  It may 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Otnes and Pleck (2003, p. 64) for a description of “guilt appeals” used by DeBeers to 
market its diamonds. 
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be brought more subtly through the fostering of organizations and social events intended 
to create the sense of a community of people involved in consumption of a given brand or 
product (Algesheimer et al., 2005; Kozinets, 2001).  Similarly, sales persons may be in a 
position to influence norms for spending amounts and expected quality levels on 
unfamiliar items (Kalra et al., 2003). 
 There is increasing recognition that community consumption standards have 
troublesome consequences for welfare.  These include household debt and bankruptcy, 
savings shortfalls, long work hours, failure to fund essential public services, and resource 
waste (Frank, 1999, 2005).  Tied to these concerns is the notion that some forms of 
consumption, even when chosen willfully by an individual, do not provide satisfaction, 
and are thus, by implication, allocatively inefficient.   As Amitai Etzioni (1998, p. 630) 
remarks: “There is … good reason to suggest that the combination of artificial fanning of 
needs and cultural pressures maintain people in consumeristic roles when these are not 
truly or deeply satisfying.”  As with other phenomena characterized by adverse network 
effects, then, the profit motive with respect to community consumption standards is 
placed in conflict with the public interest. 
 
4.  Empirical Evidence 
4.1  Specification and Regression Results 
 In this section, we use microlevel data on motor vehicle choice and its 
determinants to estimate the network effect with respect to vehicle size and the associated 
moral hazard problem.  The basic specification is a binomial logit regression that explains 
the individual household’s decision to purchase a light truck (i.e., SUV, van, minivan, or 
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pickup truck) versus a car.10  The dependent variable is a dummy variable equaling one if 
a light truck was purchased.  To construct this variable, household-level data on vehicles 
owned was drawn from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (“CEX”) of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.11  The sample for the estimation was composed of the subset consisting 
of cars or light trucks purchased new in 2003 or 2004 for those households for which it 
was possible to determine the state of residence, resulting in approximately 1,000 
purchase decision observations.12  These observations were matched to explanatory 
variable data for 2003 corresponding to the household and its members. 
 The key explanatory variable is the probability that a car or light truck in the 
household’s state of residence will be involved in a crash during the period of a year in 
which at least one occupant is killed.  This “risk of death” is calculated for each state by 
dividing the number of vehicles experiencing a crash fatality by the number of registered 
vehicles.13  Data on vehicle fatalities are from the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (“NHTSA”) 14; data on vehicle registrations are from the Federal 
                                                 
10 SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks are classified as light trucks, consistent with White (2004) and the U.S. 
Government, which was the source of all the data in the study. 
11 Public Use Microdata from the Consumer Expenditure Survey are available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm.  They may also be downloaded through the Inter-University Consortium 
for Political and Social Research (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/).  The CEX is based on national probability 
sample of the U. S. civilian population. 
12 The household’s state of residence was suppressed by the CEX for about 15% of observations to meet the 
Census Disclosure Review Board’s criterion that the smallest geographically identifiable area have a 
population of at least 100,000.  This could represent a limitation of our results. 
13 The number of vehicles (i.e., cars and light trucks) by state experiencing a crash fatality is estimated by 
taking the number of vehicle occupants killed in crashes by state and multiplying by the nationwide ratio of 
vehicles with deaths to occupants killed.  The result is divided by the total number of car and light truck 
registrations by state to obtain a probability estimate.   
14 Source for passenger vehicle occupants killed by state: NHTSA Traffic Safety Facts 2003, p. 7 (available 
at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2003/809773.pdf).  Vehicles with deaths 
nationwide estimated from the NHTSA General Estimates System (available at http://www-
nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-30/ncsa/GES.html) as weighted total of vehicles with at least one death, 
cars and light trucks only. 
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Highway Administration.15  The variable is constructed for 2003.  The hypothesis is that 
a higher risk of death leads to a greater propensity to buy light trucks as a way of 
shielding oneself and one’s family members; thus the variable is predicted to have a 
positive sign. 
 Control variables are also included that capture characteristics of the household 
that were considered possible determinants of the decision to purchase a light truck.  
These include dummy variables for whether the household resides in a metropolitan area 
with a population less than 330,000, earns more than US$75,000 per year, and reports 
some portion of use of the vehicle in question as a business expense.  Additional dummy 
variables track whether the person completing the survey is black, is male, is not single 
(i.e., either married, widowed, divorced or separated), and works in a blue collar 
profession.16  Separate variables are included for the number of cars and light trucks 
owned by the household, the number of people under the age of 18 living in the 
household, the amount of money spent on tobacco products by the household in the 
current quarter, and the age of the person completing the survey.17  Household-level 
weights are used to make the sample representative of all households. 
 In addition, a number of explanatory variables are included that consider 
interactions between household characteristics and the risk of death.  The hypothesis 
behind these variables is that, when the risk of death increases, households with certain 
                                                 
15 Federal Highway Administration, Highway Statistics 2003, section II (motor vehicles), tables MV-1 and 
MV-9 (available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs03/index.htm).  Light truck registrations 
include pickups, vans, sport utilities, and “other light” only. 
16 Blue collar professions include machine operators, assemblers, laborers, precision production 
professionals, craftspersons, repairpersons, farmers, foresters, and fisherpersons. 
17 Tobacco use is included as an indicator of a sort of high-risk, high-discount-rate lifestyle that might, we 
hypothesize, correlate positively with light truck ownership.  Because tobacco is addictive and its demand 
highly inelastic, tobacco expenditures are considered predetermined (i.e., not endogenous) relative to the 
vehicle choice decision. 
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characteristics might increase their tendency to buy a light truck more than other 
households.  For example, families with children might be more concerned about 
increased risks of death on the highway than families without children, so they might 
react more to such risks.  The interaction variables include education level of the 
household member completing the survey, presence of children in the household, 
household pretax income, and household income interacted together with the presence of 
children.  The data for these variables and the control variables above were taken from 
the 2003 CEX. 
 The results of two logit regressions are shown in Table 1: one incorporating the 
explanatory variables listed above, and one in which the male dummy and age variables 
are replaced by a dummy variable that tracks whether the person completing the survey is 
male and under 35 years of age.  The risk of death variable has the predicted positive sign 
and is statistically significant in both models.  Perhaps surprisingly, more educated 
people respond less to the increased risk of death than other people.  Regarding the other 
variables, the regression estimates suggest that light trucks are more likely to be 
purchased by young males, people who are not black, and people who are not single.  The 
incidence of light truck purchase increases with the number of people under 18 in the 
household, and when a household’s income exceeds $75,000 per year.  Taken together, 
the results reinforce the notion that the light truck today is more an accoutrement of 
affluent families than it is a professional tool of the working-class person: the high-
income dummy variable is highly significant, while tobacco expenditure and the business 
expense and blue collar dummy variables are not significant.18 
                                                 
18 These results point to the absurdity of the light-truck loophole, which exempts light trucks from the gas-
guzzler tax applied to cars with poor gas mileage.  The economic rationale for the exemption had been to 
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 In what follows, we focus our attention on the risk of death variable and its 
implications. 
 
4.2  Estimates of Network Effect 
 Consider what would happen if 1 million light trucks replaced cars on the road for 
an exogenous reason, such as a policy change or change in tastes.  White’s (2004) results 
show that between 24 and 44 additional crashes will occur per year involving deaths of 
car occupants, depending upon whether people change their driving behavior to reflect 
the lower safety record of light-truck drivers when they switch from a car to a truck (the 
latter figure) or not.19  The present results tell us that these deaths would increase the 
propensity of households to buy light trucks, implying a network effect to light-truck 
purchases.  We estimate the network effect by distributing the additional fatal crashes 
predicted by White (2004) proportionally across states based on the distribution of light 
truck registrations in 2003.  We then re-fit the logit-based probabilities of light-truck 
purchase by applying the regression coefficient estimates in Table 1 to the revised risk of 
death.  The baseline probabilities and re-fit probabilities are each averaged across the 
sample observations, applying the sampling weights.  The two average probabilities are 
then multiplied by the total new unit sales of cars and light trucks for 2003, and the 
difference is taken as an estimate of incremental light-truck sales due to the increased risk 
of death.20 
                                                                                                                                                 
avoid raising the costs of vehicles primarily used for industrial purposes, which might, in turn, reduce 
industrial output.  See Gayer (2004), p. 131. 
19 See White (2004), p. 345 for a full discussion. 
20 Source for new unit sales: U. S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
(available at 
http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/2005/html/table_01_17.html). 
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 The results are shown in Table 2.  The calculation is performed using results from 
each of the two specifications presented in Table 1, and using alternately White’s (2004) 
“no behavior change” and “behavior change” assumptions, giving a total of four 
estimates.  At minimum, incremental death risks cause 961 would-be car buyers to switch 
to light trucks when 1 million light trucks replace cars for exogenous reasons.  Not 
surprisingly, the network effect is greater when driving behavior changes to reflect the 
vehicle driven: then, an incremental light truck causes a greater number of deaths, hence 
a greater incidence of defensive light-truck purchasing. 
 
4.3  Estimates of Moral Hazard 
 Now consider a safety innovation involving a modification to an SUV or pickup 
truck that would reduce the risk of death it poses to other motorists to the risk level posed 
by cars.  Suppose that the light trucks thus modified are otherwise identical in every 
detail to other light trucks – for example, a safety-enhanced Hummer H2 looks and drives 
just like an unenhanced Hummer H2.  Suppose further that the safety innovation is 
developed at NHTSA using taxpayer money and is provided to vehicle makers for their 
implementation at no cost to them.  Would the manufacturers implement it? 
 What complicates the answer to this question is that making light trucks less 
deadly decreases their salability – a consequence of the network effect.  Consider an 
implementation of the hypothetical innovation on 1 million light trucks.  Since the 
modified trucks are assumed otherwise to be no different than unmodified light trucks, 
driver behavior is assumed unchanged.  According to White (2004), such a change would 
reduce the number of crashes fatal to car occupants by 24.  Analogous to our method for 
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estimating the network effect, we distribute the reduction in fatal crashes across states 
based on the distribution of light truck registrations in 2003.  We then re-fit the 
probabilities of light-truck purchase by applying the regression coefficient estimates in 
Table 1 to the revised risk of death.  The baseline probabilities and re-fit probabilities are 
each averaged across the sample observations, applying the sampling weights.  The two 
average probabilities are then multiplied by the total new unit sales of cars and light 
trucks for 2003, and the difference is taken as an estimate of lost light-truck unit sales due 
to the decreased risk of death.  We estimate that approximately 855 or 862 would-be light 
truck buyers choose to buy a car instead, using coefficient estimates from the first and 
second regressions, respectively. 
 The lost sales are then divided by the number of lives saved to obtain the 
manufacturer’s tradeoff in vehicles per life; the results of this calculation are displayed in 
Table 2.  Assuming 1.15 deaths per fatal crash, the number of lives saved is estimated to 
be 24 ×  1.15 = 27.6.21  The resulting tradeoff is 855.09/27.6 = 30.98 vehicles per life for 
the first specification, and 861.89/27.6 = 31.23 vehicles per life for the second 
specification.  The lost sales do not represent a complete loss of earnings, as they are 
presumably offset by profits from the sale of substituted cars.  Nevertheless, motor 
vehicle manufacturers are placed in the position of weighing their non-pecuniary concern 
for human life against the desire for higher profits from the sale of more profitable 
vehicles. 
 
5.  Policy Implications 
                                                 
21 See White (2004), p. 349. 
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 It is well-recognized that private incentives often fail to align with the public 
good.  But when adverse network effects lead to moral hazard, policy problems 
associated with the divergence of public and private incentives are exacerbated.  In these 
situations, the typical public policy solution aimed at reducing or eliminating an outcome 
damaging to the public good will be less effective or encounter greater resistance from 
private interests.  Consequently, effective solutions entail a greater public cost. 
 Consider the effect of a policy that taxes motor vehicle makers a certain amount 
for every life lost by other motorists in crashes that involve their vehicles.  Using the 
model set forth in section 2, this would be represented by imposing a per-unit tax, t’, on 
λ , where the level of  t’ is set by the policy maker to induce the socially optimal level of 
λ .  Figure 1 illustrates the effect of the tax.  Here 0Pλ λ λ≡ −  represents the third-party’s 
manipulation of λ  relative to 0λ .  The traditional textbook analysis of such a policy 
suggests that the firm will choose an abatement level that sets the marginal (private) cost 
of abatement equal to the per-unit tax.22  Applying this in the model implies ' 0Pλ <  
determined by ( )' 'PC tλ λ− = , where ( )' 0PCλ λ <  for ' 0Pλ <  because abatement of λ  is 
costly. 
 But this analysis ignores the value of λ  to the firm in increasing output.  The 
actual level of Pλ  chosen by the firm given the tax – say, "Pλ  –  arises from 
maximization of a modified version of equation (1): 
 ( ) ( ), ,Q C tλ θ λ θ λΠ = − −  (14) 
The first-order conditions with respect to Pλ  are 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., Browning and Browning (1986), pp. 247-248. 
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 However, an increase in the tax rate is tantamount to an increase in cost to a 
policy maker who is seeking to maximize political support (Peltzman, 1976; Hettich and 
Winer, 1988).  The taxed parties – in this case, motor vehicle makers – will step up 
resistance when the tax on them is larger.  So, optimal public policy comes at a greater 
political cost when adverse network effect-induced moral hazard is present.   
 In addition to informing generally on the cost-benefit calculation involved the 
mitigating the results of adverse network effects, the model can provide new insights on 
current policy debates.  One example concerns the recent debate in the United States over 
new corporate average fuel economy regulations, often referred to as the CAFE 
standards.  In proposing a new structure for the CAFE standards, the Bush 
Administration argued recently that when fuel economy standards are phased in too 
quickly, they lead to unnecessary highway deaths because small vehicles are too light and 
unsafe relative to larger vehicles.  The new structure reflects this logic by allowing larger 
light trucks to meet lower fuel economy standards than smaller light trucks, whereas the 
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previous structure had applied a single standard to all light trucks.  The new standards are 
intended not to encourage manufacturers reduce the weight of their light trucks to 
improve mileage, but rather to accomplish mileage improvements though other 
innovations such as hybrid electric systems.23 
 While White’s (2004) analysis raises concerns with respect to this policy, the 
analysis in the present paper identifies additional problematic issues.  According to White 
(2004), increasing the average size of vehicles on the road will increase the number of 
highway deaths, not decrease it as the Bush Administration has suggested.  This is 
because the negative external effects of vehicle size on other motorists outweigh the 
benefits of size to the vehicle’s own occupants.  Thus the proposed new CAFE standards 
may imperil more people than they protect.  The present paper’s analysis adds to these 
concerns problems stemming from consumer perceptions fostered by the Bush 
Administration’s rhetoric.  By stressing the importance of the size of one’s own vehicle 
in ensuring the safety of one’s occupants, the Administration increases the perception that 
the greater the risks on the road, the better off a consumer is driving a light truck.  In the 
model’s terminology, consumers are encouraged to perceive θ  to be larger than they had 
thought previously, though θ  itself is not changed by the policy. 
 There are three main effects, to the extent that the Administration’s messages are 
treated as credible, new information.  First, the Administration’s rhetoric will act as a 
marketing message supporting light truck sales.  That is, it will directly increase the 
demand for light trucks relative to cars, as people adjust their perceptions regarding the 
value of driving a light truck as protection against the existing risk of death.  This, in turn, 
                                                 
23 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, “Does Lighter Equal Deadlier?”  The New York Times, August 28, 2005, section 
4, p. 4. 
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will result in more highway fatalities.24  Second, the network effect will be increased, 
causing future increases in the perceived risk of death to translate into a greater rate of 
switching from cars to light trucks.  Third, as (9) shows, the increase in θ  will increase 
manufacturers’ moral hazard; that is, it will encourage manufacturers to increase λ , 
making light trucks even more unsafe to remaining car drivers, and further increasing the 
incidence of highway fatalities. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 SUV-posed safety risks, white flight, and community consumption standards are 
recognized problems that raise important welfare concerns.  This paper has shown that 
these problems are made more worrisome because they are set in motion by 
manipulatable network externalities.  Each such problem has associated with it some 
private party with the power to exacerbate the problem and incentives contrary to the 
public good.  This means that public policy solutions will generally involve greater 
implementation costs, in that they will entail conflict with or buyout of the private 
entity’s adversarial interests.  It is conceivable that, in some situations, the moral hazard 
issue will simply render policy solutions to such problems politically infeasible. 
 The role of this paper has been primarily to identify and describe the problem of 
adverse network effects with moral hazard and provide some empirical evidence of its 
existence in a particular case.  Future research could make additional contributions in 
several ways.  First, it would be illuminating to identify other examples of adverse 
                                                 
24 Note the result here differs from the welfare effect of an actual increase in θ , as described in (A3).  
There is no real increase in the shielding provided to light truck passengers in the scenario we are 
considering, just an increase in the perceptions with respect to existing shielding. 
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network effects with moral hazard among current policy issues.  Second, given that 
private-public sector conflict is a key feature of the adverse network effects problem, it 
would be helpful to develop specific conflict resolution approaches that can address 
associated policy issues at minimum cost and with the greatest chance of actual 
resolution.  Third, in view of the role of moral hazard in the problem, a different 
approach to developing policy solutions could involve investigating incentive compatible 
mechanisms that the policymaker might use to obtain desired action from the adversarial 
private party. 
 
Appendix 
A.1  Proof of Proposition 3 
 Welfare at ( ),λ θ  is, for 0 1v θλ≤ − ,25 
                                                 
25 We do not need to evaluate at 0 1v θλ> − , because then 
*
0vλ
∂ =∂  and the principal will not increase 
λ . 
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The derivative of W with respect to λ  is, for 0 1v θλ≤ − , 
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A.2  Proof of Proposition 4 
 Welfare at ( ),λ θ  is, for 0 1v θλ≤ − , as shown in (A1).  The derivative of W with 
respect to θ  is: 
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Thus, 0Wθ
∂ >∂  when 
0
2
vλθ λ
−> , and 0Wθ
∂ <∂  when 
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Table 1 Results of Logit Regressions Explaining the Decision
to Purchase a Light Truck Rather Than a Car
Standard errors are in parentheses
N  = 998
Risk of death 17042.4 (6669.0)a 16370.7 (6606.7)b
Small metro 0.0302 (.209) -0.0123 (.210)
Income > $75K 0.577 (.163)a 0.623 (.164)a
Business expense 0.523 (.360) 0.517 (.350)
Black -0.595 (.300)b -0.637 (.296)b
Male 0.278 (.148)c
Age -0.0103 (.0057)c
Young male 0.686 (.244)a
Not single 0.475 (.264)c 0.478 (.250)c
Blue collar 0.267 (.227) 0.336 (.222)
No. of vehicles 0.0358 (.0692) 0.0462 (.0689)
No. in HH < 18 yrs. old 0.214 (.090)b 0.249 (.0870)a
Tobacco exp. -0.0008 (.0012) -0.0006 (.0011)
Risk of death · Education -965.4 (458.0)b -893.4 (452.6)b
Risk of death · Kids -1378.7 (2543.0) -1225.2 (2498.5)
Risk of death · Income -0.00785 (.0155) -0.00870 (.0150)
Risk of death · Kids · Income -0.00142 (.0207) -0.000019 (.0202)
Constant -0.997 (.379)a -1.474 (.330)a
aSignificant at p < 0.01 level. cSignificant at p < 0.10 level.
bSignificant at p < 0.05 level.
Specification #1 Specification #2
Table 2 Estimates of Network Effect and Moral Hazard
NETWORK EFFECT from replacing 1 million cars with light trucks:
Increase in number of light trucks sold rather than cars
No behavior change +961 +967
Behavior change +1800 +1812
MORAL HAZARD: Lost light truck unit sales per life saved
through external safety innovations.
No behavior change -30.98 -31.23
Specification #1 Specification #2
Specification #1 Specification #2
Figure 1: A Tax on Lives Lost by Other Motorists
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